The Republic of Moldova is once again going through several crises:
- an energy one, as Russia has reduced the supply of electricity and gas to the maximum, and on the threshold of winter, the country barely manages to cover the necessary supply with the help of Romania and the European Union.
- an economic one, amplified by the energy one, by the complicated context throughout Europe, but also by the war in Ukraine that led to the flow of refugees that put enormous financial pressure on this small state and caused the loss of some exports to Ukraine and Russia.
- a political one, due to the fact that Maia Sandu and her government are declining in popularity, and the party of Ilan Șor, a politician on the run, as he is facing a criminal conviction, is funding the protests against the current government. Also, pro-Russian forces are taking advantage of the difficult economic situation to fuel a fall of the Executive and possibly the organization of early elections.
How will Maia Sandu face all these crises and what are her chances of being re-elected president? What does the fall of the PAS government mean for the pro-European option of the Republic of Moldova and how does the EU support the current power in Chisinau?
PRESShub discussed with Dionis Cenușă, a political risk analyst based in Germany, where he is pursuing his doctoral studies at the Justus-Liebig University in Giessen.
He is an Associate Expert at the Think Tank „Expert-Grup” (Moldova) and the Eastern European Studies Centre (Lithuania). He holds a MA degree in European Interdisciplinary Studies from the College of Europe (2013) and is an alumnus of the Advanced Program in EU Law and Economics at Riga Law School (2014).
Dionis Cenușă’s most important statements
Even the pro-Russian forces can see the importance of convenient relations with the EU, showing pragmatism in regards to the European financial assistance.
Thanks to the initiation of the pre-accession dialogue with the EU, the Moldovan authorities are staying afloat, even if the socio-economic situation in the country risks deteriorating in the next 4 months.
There are kleptocratic groups outside the country that want to exploit the crises the government is going through, in order to weaken it, with the attempt to bring about the fall of the government and trigger early parliamentary elections.
At the head of the protests is the businessman Ilan Shor, who has been hiding from the Moldovan justice in Israel since 2019.
We are witnessing an exploitation of poverty by some representatives of the political class, which has also happened before in Moldova, but back then it was during the election campaigns and on a much smaller scale.
PRESShub: In June this year, the Republic of Moldova received the EU candidate status, despite the fact that the economy and the rule of law in the country were deeply affected by the kleptocratic regimes. How do you think the war in Ukraine favored the granting of this status?
Dionis Cenușă: In the process of obtaining the candidate country status, the regional context helped more than the internal preparation. First, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has changed the perception of regional actors, such as EU, on regional security.
Thus, the opening for the EU enlargement is, above all, an attempt to increase security in the European neighborhood.
The second major consideration that favored Moldova’s candidacy is the Ukrainian precedent. With the request for candidacy by Ukraine, the other states with Association Agreements with the EU – Moldova and Georgia – followed the Ukrainian impulse. Therefore, the pro-active character of Ukrainian diplomacy led the EU to overcome its enlargement phobias.
Demonstrating solidarity with the Ukrainian cause against the Russian invasion, the EU found itself forced to extend the same policy of openness towards Moldova and Georgia. Therefore, Ukraine has a considerable merit in the context of Moldova obtaining the candidate status.
The Republic of Moldova could not become an EU candidate country without the clear political signal given to Brussels by the government in Chisinau regarding its commitment in the accession process. Moldova accelerated the completion of the European Commission’s accession questionnaire, sending in one month the answers to over 2,100 questions. By comparison, Bosnia needed 14 months to complete the same questionnaire.
At that time, Chisinau was visited by more than 30 delegations of high-ranking officials of the EU countries, and the High-Level Political Dialogue between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union was launched.
How much do you think this achievement of Maia Sandu’s government contributed to increasing her political support among the population at home? How do the citizens of the Republic of Moldova view the prospect of joining the EU?
The exponents of the government in Chisinau often use to state that if they had not been at the helm of the state, Moldova would have failed to obtain the candidate status. The reality, however, is more nuanced.
The Moldovan political forces with pro-Russian sympathies that governed in the period 2019-2021, and were in a conjunctural alliance of about half a year with the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), led back then by Maia Sandu, did not undermine in any way the Association Agreement with the EU.
Even the pro-Russian forces see the importance of convenient relations with the EU, showing pragmatism in regards to the European financial assistance.
Therefore, if the pro-EU and pro-reform party PAS had not been in government, the pro-Russian forces would have probably tried to apply for EU membership.
However, the result would have been different in a negative sense. Most probably, Brussels could have offered Moldova at most the potential candidate country status, as in the case of Georgia, which has relatively complicated relations with the EU due to the presence of the elements typical for a captured state.
In the context of the hyper-optimistic attitude towards the current government in Chisinau, it was easier for the EU, from a political point of view, to offer Moldova the status of a candidate country.
Like Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova received two questionnaires, which together contained about 3,700 questions[1]. The answers were sent to the European Commission in about a month (11 April – 11 May).
Several factors contributed to the speed with which the Moldovan side managed to transmit the answers for the two questionnaires. First, there was a certain amount of competition and haste regarding the timing of political decisions within the European institutions.
On the one hand, Ukraine received the questionnaires earlier and therefore sent the answers a few days ahead than Moldova and Georgia. On the other hand, the three countries wanted to complete the questionnaire stage before the meeting of EU heads of state within the European Council on June 23-24, during which the granting of the candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova was finally approved.
Bosnia and other Western Balkan states were not exposed to such time pressure, which influenced to some extent the different dynamic of the questionnaire filling process.
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Secondly, like Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova has been engaged in the implementation process of the Association Agreement since 2014. This allowed the development of certain professional abilities regarding the adaptation of the national legislation to European standards.
As a result, the answer to the questions was not prepared from scratch, but there was a knowledge base from where to start within the institutions. Last but not least, the efficient preparation of the answers, in the case of Moldova, was due to an effective collaboration between the government and some representatives of the civil society, specialized in European affairs.
Also, some representatives of the diaspora, who have political affiliation or sympathies with PAS, were involved in the translation and the verification of the English text.
The questionnaire answering process was not fully transparent and inclusive, which caused some criticism from the opposition and the expert community that was excluded or not involved in this process.
The fact that Moldova obtained the candidate status did not contribute to the strengthening of Maia Sansu’s and the government popularity, which actually collapsed in the context of the multiple crises that the country was facing.
However, the seemingly unconditional support from the EU, together with the candidate country status, does not allow for a total decline in the public support for the government.
In other words, thanks to the initiation of the pre-accession dialogue with the EU, the Moldovan authorities are staying afloat, even if the socio-economic situation in the country risks deteriorating in the next 4 months.
In the context of these unfavorable conditions, although pro-EU sympathies among the population still fluctuate, a stabilization trend is emerging at around 60%.
Moreover, in the recent months, the population’s protests against Maia Sandu’s government have been the subject of the main news regarding the Republic of Moldova. Why are people taking to the streets now?
There are two phenomena that intersect when we talk about the protests in Moldova.
On the one hand, there are the kleptocratic groups outside the country that want to exploit the crises the government is going through in order to weaken it, with the attempt to generate the fall of the government and trigger early parliamentary elections.
At the head of the protests is the businessman Ilan Șor, who has been hiding from the Moldovan justice in Israel since 2019.
Şor’s party organizes protests, which meet the characteristics of the ‘orchestrated protests’ or ‘kleptocratic protests’ against the government, using financial resources of dubious origin.
On the other hand, Moldova faces a high level of poverty in the rural regions and among certain social categories (eg. pensioners). This is an old problem, but it became more acute with the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The impoverished population is vulnerable to being recruited for the ‘kleptocratic protests’ carried out by the Șor Party.
Finally, we are witnessing an exploitation of poverty by some representatives of the political class, which has also happened before in Moldova, although this took place rather during the election campaigns, and on a much smaller scale.
There is evidence that the protesters go to protests because in this way they can make some money. The protest remuneration, combined with the worsening of the living conditions due to the energy and socio-economic crisis, disinhibits the poor or impoverished protesters and increases the risk of more aggressive protests.
Dionis Cenușă’s most important statements
The pro-Russian forces do not exclude the option of the anticipated elections, but they do not force things to trigger them quickly, as do the kleptocratic groups, whose main leader, Ilan Șor, feels threatened by the results of the Moldovan justice system.
The forced liquidation of a political party, which is in the top of the most popular parties in the country, constitutes a challenge that PAS-Sandu will have to weigh well before adopting any radical decisions in this regard.
More than half of the approximately 100,000 refugees, who as a matter of fact were permanently on the territory of Moldova, were accommodated in citizens’ houses and not in specialized centers.
In a recent analysis, you have made the observation that some media in Moldova choose, in the current political context, to practice self-censorship and to avoid taking a critical position towards the government in order to prevent the pro-Russian opposition from exploiting the public discontent.
Pluralism of opinion is self-suspended to avoid putting in danger the national stability and security. How does the pro-Russian opposition endanger the stability and the national security of the Republic of Moldova?
The pro-Russian forces and the kleptocratic groups pursue selfish political goals, which may fully or partially correspond to Russia’s geopolitical interests in Moldova.
The fall of the current government is their common goal. This would radically change Moldova’s foreign policy, it would disfigure a series of reforms initiated by the PAS-Sandu political equation in the field of the rule of law, but it could create fertile ground for unilateral concessions in relation to the Transnistrian region.
However, there is a difference between the approaches of the kleptocratic groups and those pursued by the pro-Russian forces. The kleptocratic groups, led by the Şor Party, which is considered an element of the malignant Russian influence in Moldova, want the prompt collapse of the government and the triggering of early legislative elections.
In contrast, the pro-Russian forces that are dominated by the Socialists want the weakening of the government before the local elections in 2023 and the gradual preparation of the ground for ordinary presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024-25.
The pro-Russian forces do not exclude the option of the anticipated elections, but they do not force things to trigger them quickly, as do the kleptocratic groups, whose main leader, Ilan Șor, feels threatened by the results of the Moldovan justice system.
The Ministry of Justice in Chisinau proposed the outlawing of Ilan Șor’s Party. Could it be stated that such a measure could harm democracy, given that multipartyism falls within the definition of democracy?
Punishing illegal funding is a common practice in a democratic systems, but the same cannot be said for outlawing political parties. The situation is complicated by the fact that the Șor Party has representation in parliament.
Therefore, the forced liquidation of a political party, which is in the top of the most popular parties in the country, constitutes a challenge that PAS-Sandu will have to weigh well before adopting any radical decisions in this regard.
Apart from the fact that the votes of the supporters of Şor’s Party will be annulled, the expulsion of this party from the legal political spectrum may create a dangerous precedent. If things change in the opposite direction, then even pro-EU parties could be threatened with future outlawing on charges of real or fictitious illegal funding.
To what extent is the presence of the Russian troops stationed in Transnistria a cause of concern for Moldova’s security, in the context of the war in Ukraine? What were the measures taken by the government to reduce this risk factor and how do you rate these measures?
The Russian troops based in the Transnistrian region pose a threat to the national security and the public order, given the events in Ukraine. Although these Russian troops number about 1,500 people, they can be activated at any time if Russia decides it is appropriate to do so.
According to some negative scenarios, the Russian troops can also be used to help install some pro-Russian forces in power, in the case of mass anti-government protests and of the escalation of the political-military situation in the country.
The measures that the authorities undertake are related to the modernization of the national defense capabilities, but they depend on the external assistance, which is ad hoc one and oriented towards non-lethal equipment. For this reason, the risks posed by the Russian troops in Transnistria are not appropriately addressed.
Roberta Metsola, the President of the European Parliament, and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, visited the Republic of Moldova to show the EU’s support to Moldova, both in terms of the accession process and for facing the current problems generated by the energy crisis.
Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU was offering the Republic of Moldova an additional aid package, worth 250 million euros, for the purchase of gas and the compensation of high energy costs for the population. Could the fact that the two visits coincided be correlated with the population’s current street protests? To what extent can EU aid help solve the energy crisis?
Two aspects made for Moldova to be visited by so many foreign officials. First of all, Moldova is a stopping point before arriving in Ukraine, especially if the purpose of the visits was the Odessa region. Also, the government in Chisinau has made extensive calls for humanitarian aid to manage the Ukrainian refugee crisis. Consequently, various external actors traveled to Moldova to show solidarity and to inspect the situation related to the Ukrainian refugees.
Metsola and von der Leyen’s recent visits seem to be closely related to the political processes in Moldova. The governance needs both political and financial support from the EU, a fact which the political actors in Brussels understand.
It is important to note that both Metsola and von der Leyen are part of the European People’s Party, to which the PAS formation, from which President Sandu comes, is also affiliated. Therefore, in addition to the relations that the EU has with Moldova, there is in parallel a strong transnational influence that is exercised at the level of political parties. Probably, some steps are coordinated at the level of the European institutions and respectively on the line of the European People’s Party.
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The visit of the European officials coincided with the worsening of the energy crisis due to the latest attacks on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. European officials also arrived in Moldova after the outbreak of a large-scale political scandal related to the leak of information from the Minister of Justice, Sergiu Litvinenco’s Telegram account.
These leaks point to an alleged political interference of the ruling party in the investigations of the high corruption cases (the file of ex-president Igor Dodon, the investigation of the suspended general prosecutor Alexandr Stoianoglo), in the reform of justice and in the appointments for the anti-corruption agencies (the head of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office Veronica Drăgălin).
The 250 million euros represents a considerable addition to what has been offered so far to manage the energy crisis. However, this money is not enough to cover the expenses for subsidizing the population and for the other needs, planned by the authorities for the period November 2022-March 2023.
The government representatives mentioned that around 1 billion euros are needed to survive the winter.[2] Only a fraction of what external partners offer to Moldova is in the form of a grant, the rest being credits that the country must return.
Ursula von del Leyen specified that the Republic of Moldova is being helped just as Moldova in its turn helped the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees who crossed its territory, fleeing the Russian invasion. From your knowledge, what is the current situation of refugees in the Republic of Moldova and how do the authorities manage to deal with it?
Moldova received aid to manage the refugee crisis. Without external aid, the administrative apparatus of the state, especially at the local level, would have collapsed. Moreover, the aid provided by Moldova to the refugees was due to the population that took over a major part of the refugee flow pressure.
More than half of the approximately 100,000 refugees, who as a matter of fact were permanently on the territory of Moldova, were accommodated in citizens’ houses and not in specialized centers.
We talk here about 12,000 Moldovan families, who in the March-October period received about 4 million dollars (March-October 2022), within the UN World Food Program, in the form of transfers for the care of refugees.
In addition, there are approximately 69 refugee accommodation centers operating throughout the country. Although the number of refugees was decreasing, according to some sources, Moldova shelters around 95,000 Ukrainian refugees[3]. The worsening of the energy crisis is putting additional pressure on families who host Ukrainian refugees.
Next year there are going to be local elections in Moldova, and in less than two years by now, the presidential elections. Do you think that PAS and Maia Sandu will be able to get a second term in government?
It is very likely that the current crises that the government fails to manage effectively will leave deep imprints on the voters’ perception. Local elections in 2023 will become a serious test for the government, although, as a rule, the local results do not necessarily reflect the political preferences at the national level.
However, the effects of the energy crisis will be profound and could generate certain changes in the general electoral behavior of the population. Therefore, the formation of a protest vote against PAS-Sandu is likely.
The government and its supporters in the media and in the civil society show active interest in electronic voting. Its implementation will be particularly crucial for the 2025 parliamentary elections.
Still, the government relies on the vote of the diaspora, which will vote differently than the population in the country, where the degree of frustration towards the quality of the governance and the interest in political alternatives increases.
In any case, Sandu has a strong chance of being re-elected. Despite the crises, the president has the highest level of trust, partly due to the active and unconditional support of Western political actors.
The only candidate with a relevant electoral potential is the current mayor of the capital, Ion Ceban. But his candidacy may be affected by the radioactivity of the reference made by the US, regarding the alleged links between Ceban and the Russian secret services.
The political fate of PAS will depend to some extent on Sandu’s electoral performance. In any case, even if PAS accumulates a massive vote in diaspora, including through electronic voting, the vote in the country will be harder to accumulate in 2025 than it was in 2021 due to the effects of the crises in 2022, but also due to the scandals surrounding the suspicions of the politicization of justice reform and the fight against grand corruption.
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[1] More details can be analyzed in a policy document on this topic published this September: The EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia: Enlargement from the Western Balkans to the Eastern Partnership.
[2] [2] More information here.
[3] Here https://www.statista.com/statistics/1312584/ukrainian-refugees-by-country/
